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On the Copyright Hermeneutics of the Original
This section of the CIHA Congress asks for definitions of the original. 
The range of possible answers is broad, and those answers remain 
inconclusive. From the specific perspective of copyright law, a recent 
UK textbook states that sit is very difficult if not impossible to state 
with any precision what copyright law means when it demands that 
works be original.#1 Despite these obvious complications, this article 
attempts to shed some light on the definition of originality in the con­
text of copyright. Far from attempting to paint a complete picture, the 
present article will first describe the term as a concept linking a work 
of art to its author, before going on to delineate important steps in co­
pyright history, focusing on a few exemplary artists and their aware­
ness for copyright issues.2 While the legal definition of the original 
takes into account artistic categories, these are in turn informed by 
copyright law, its restrictions and its potential.
Originality has been referred to as the »bedrock principle of copy­
right# by the US Supreme Court.3 This observation is true for intel­
lectual property law in many countries.4 By means of example, in the 
United States, 17 USC. § 102(a) (2006) provides: Copyright protec­
tion subsists [...] in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.# Similarly, the UK Copyright, Designs and Pa­
tents Act 1988 (CDPA) protects ((original literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic works« in its first provision (s.1, 1 a). Other countries refer 
not to originality, but to creativity. For example, in Germany, § 2 (2) of 
the Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG) clearly states that the 
law exclusively protects personal intellectual creations. Similarly, Art. 
L-112-1 of the French law on intellectual property (Code de la Propriete
Intellectuelle, CPI) declares the protection of all »ceuvres d’esprit.«
While the scope of these various laws is expressed slightly diffe­
rently, ultimately they all protect an almost identical body of works. 
Originality and creativity seem to be two concepts describing diffe­
rent aspects of a continuous aesthetic process: an author creates 
an original work. Whereas originality focuses on the work created, 
creativity highlights the author as the originator of the work. In this 
way the term of the original connects the work of art with its origin, 
that is with its author, and is indeed »an inescapable requirement.#5
Non-originals: reproductions, copies, series, casts
It is also necessary to examine just what an original is not, even within 
copyright law. Legal terminology is more often than not system­
atic, and it is impossible to assess the meaning of one term without 
recourse to other terms such as opposites or related but varying 
terms. It is striking that there is no such thing as the opposite of 
an original. It is an asymmetric term. Very often we understand the 
original to be the opposite of fakes and forgeries.6 Flowever, the legal 
problems of copyright infringement and fakes overlap only coinci­
dentally, both representing concepts that are distinct from one an­
other. While the forger wants his own work to appear to be somebody 
else’s, and the copyright infringer (the »pirate«) uses somebody 
else’s work to appear to be his own, the two situations do not ne­
cessarily coincide: nOriginal and genuine are two different things.«7
Within the copyright system, typical non-originals are the repro­
duction and the copy. The terminology is not always precise, and the 
law is inclusive. Copyright has a common understanding of replicas, 
reproductions in other media (for example engravings and photog-
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William Hogarth, A Rake’s Progress, 1735, 
plate II, engraving, 350 x 403 mm.
London, British Museum (inv.no. 1868,0822.1529)
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raphs), facsimiles and copies in the same medium - they are all 
»copies.«8 Nowadays, the right to copy, or copyright, lies exclusively 
with the author. Copyright guarantees the author’s rights to utilise 
and dispose of their works, namely to copy, to exhibit, to distribute 
and to exploit these wbrks, and to prevent other people from doing 
so.9 It guarantees that artists remain in control of their work. Copy­
right can be transferred and licensed, but all copies, reproductions, 
translations etc. made without the artist’s consent, constitute a copy­
right infringement and are illegal.10
An original within the meaning of copyright law does not have to 
be unique. Serial works of art can be original in that they stem from 
a creative author, while several instances of the work (»copies«) 
exist. This question is dependent on certain media, and one must 
be careful not to misinterpret the legal and technical meanings of 
the original." Perhaps the most prominent example are photographs 
from the pre-digital age, where prints are made from the negative. 
While the latter is the technical original, the printed (technical) 
copies can nevertheless be originals in the sense of copyright law. 
Prints such as lithographs, engravings and etchings are further ex­
amples of media involving techniques of reproduction from a techni­
cal original - a lithographic stone or a copper plate. Similarly, bronze 
casts are created from an original sculpture.
These techniques prompt complex issues regarding originality 
and authorship. For instance, not every cast is automatically an ori­
ginal in the sense of copyright law. The connection between creator 
and work becomes weaker after the artist’s death. A bronze cast 
may be considered an original if it has been supervised by the 
artist himself or has at least been personally authorised by him. It 
has been claimed that under German copyright law, posthumous 
casts are not considered to be original works.12 In the words of an 
American lawyer: xCopies can be authorized, but only works can 
be authored.«'3 Technically and materially, however, more casts can 
be produced after the artist’s death. Auguste Rodin’s sBourgeois de 
Calais*) have been cast in a limited edition of twelve copies, only four
of which were produced during Rodin’s lifetime.14 The other eight 
were cast under the auspicies of the French State, more specifically 
the Musee Rodin in Paris, as the inheritor of Rodin’s copyright. While 
copyright in Rodin’s work expired 70 years after his death, in France 
the moral rights of the author are perpetual (Art. L. 121-1 Code de 
la Propriety Intellectuelle), which is why the Musee Rodin still acts 
as administrator of the artist’s moral rights pursuant to the French 
Decree 93-163 from 2 February 1993. Although it is a widespread 
opinion that French copyright law limits the number of original casts 
to twelve,'5 the opposite is the case, and rules of best practice do 
not automatically become enforceable. A related rule is to be found 
in Art. 71, No. 3 of the French Code general des impots, annexe 3, 
which defines eight casts as original works of art for the purposes of 
taxation. Flowever, there is an ongoing demand in the art market for 
more Rodins, and copies of his sculptures are still being cast. Wheth­
er these casts are »original« is no longer a question of copyright, but 
rather a question of authenticity in terms of connoisseurship, the art 
market and collectors’ demand. In addition to Rodin, Edgar Degas 
is another recent case that has been the subject of much debate.16 
Flowever, the present article does not provide scope for a lengthy 
discussion of these intricacies.17 As mentioned before, the problems 
of fakes and copyright infringement overlap but are not equivalent. 
Notwithstanding this fact, many facets of the copyright definition of 
the original are shared with other meanings within the law, within 
the market, and within art history. In this sense, xcopyright history 
is not just another branch of positive law,« as the editors of a recent 
collection of essays on the matter have made clear, but rather one of 
many indicators of a network of social and aesthetic relationships.18 
In this sense, copyright history is art history, and artists have often 
intuitively understood these links.
Artists and copyright: Diirer to Flogarth
One of copyright’s most famous early cases - Diirer vs. Raimondi - 
cannot, of course, be overlooked in Nuremberg on such an occasion
Fig. 2
Piracy of plate II of Hogarth’s Rake’s Progress, 
1735, 268 x 327 mm. 
London, British Museum (inv.no. 1878,0914.2)
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Fig. 3 Napoleon Sarony, Oscar Wilde, No. 18, photograph
as this conference. In the second edition of his »Vite« (1568) Giorgio 
Vasari gave a lively account of how Durer sued Marcantonio in Ve­
nice for breach of privilege. Raimondi had distributed pirated copies 
of his prints, including the famous AD monogram. The Signoria of Ve­
nice is said to have ordered Marcantonio not to use Durers signature 
on his copies, but otherwise dismissed the German’s complaint.19 
Since no sources have hitherto been unearthed from the collections 
of the Archivio di Stato in Venice, we have no written evidence other 
than Vasari’s account. While Marcantonio copied, as a matter of 
fact, Durer’s »Life of the Virgin# including the German’s monogram, 
Vasari adapted the story of the court case from a decree issued 
by the city council of Nuremberg.20 However, Venice implemented 
laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property as ear­
ly as 1474, together with a tight-knit system of privileges.2' Durer’s 
1511 privilege, issued by the German Emperor and mentioned in the 
colophon of his »Life of the Virgin,«22 is as well known as the fact 
that his images were for years repeatedly copied by other artists, 
both in Germany and abroad. Conceding that Durer’s mind was, in 
Erwin Panofsky’s words, ((dominated by the idea of (originality,<«23 
the kind of originality protected by Venetian laws was more techni­
cal than aesthetic: printmakers obtained privileges for new printing 
techniques, letterforms or printing processes, not for their aestheti­
cally creative work. A prominent example is the privilege from 1500 
for the map of Venice, which was designed by Jacopo de’ Barbari
and published by Anton Kolb.24 It is therefore likely that the imperial 
privilege of 1511 was granted to Durer the publisher rather than Durer 
the artist25 - notwithstanding the contemporary fluidity of the 
concept of such a profession.26 Returning to Vasari’s case, Raimondi’s 
prints were made using a different technique from Durer’s; they are 
engravings, not woodcuts. Furthermore, while a privilege is often 
equated with copyright, the legal differences are pronounced. In 
particular, the notion of an original work of an individual, which is at 
the core of copyright, is not part of the system of privileges, which 
were bestowed by a governmental authority on any individual worthy 
of distinction and protection, in some instances providing temporary 
monopolies.27 The lawyer Edouard Romberg remarked in 1892 that 
Raphael and Rubens would have been surprised by a conversation 
about copyright.28 The facts and fiction of the Durer-Raimondi episo­
de have recently been the object of a renewed analysis.29
Where Durer fought for his author’s rights on his own, artists’ 
organisations gained more power and momentum. For decades, 
artists sought to obtain guarantees to protect the commercial 
potential of their works that reproductions and copies represented. 
These issues were repeatedly discussed at the Academie Royale in 
Paris (founded in 1648), but also in associations such as the Academy 
of St Luke. Sculptors were unhappy that the manufacturers cast­
ing their bronzes were apparently selling casts and bypassing the 
artist. Not until the late 17th century was the relationship between 
sculptors and founders settled by administrative decrees.30 Promi­
nent artists such as Rubens made sure that their reproductive en­
gravings enjoyed the protection of several privileges from European 
monarchs.31 It was William Hogarth who initiated the next important 
step in copyright history. In 1735 he petitioned Parliament for an 
act protecting his prints. After a veritable lobbying campaign,32 the 
parliament passed the Engraving Copyright Act (8 Geo. II, c. 13), 
commonly known as Hogarth Act, the first modern copyright law for 
images.33 The artist had deferred the publication of his new series 
of engravings, »The Rake’s Progress,# until the new law came into 
effect. In the meantime, a piratical print seller sent his agents to 
Hogarth’s shop to report back about the artist’s completed but un­
published engravings after his own paintings. They reported back to 
the dealer’s engravers, who immediately set out to complete a series 
from memory. It is hardly surprising that these illicit prints did not 
turn out to be exact copies (see figs. 1-2) - Hogarth thought they 
were ((executed most wretchedly both in Design and Drawing.«34The 
new law protected original prints, meaning those that were both de­
signed and printed by the artist, for 14 years. In 1766 this protection 
was extended to include reproductions and new editions, and the 
copyright term was extended to 28 years.35
It is worth repeating that, in this way, modern copyright law from 
the outset traced the legitimacy of copyright and its exclusion of 
other individuals from copying a work of art to that work’s author.36 
Legitimacy was no longer derived from the sovereign’s power, as 
was the case with the privilege, but was declared to be rooted in the 
artist’s creative individuality. While this new approach also benefited 
publishers (perhaps even more so than the artists themselves), these 
ideas became more convincing in view of the ideals of the Enlighten­
ment and individual freedom of expression. The French writer Simon 
Linguet observed in 1777 that those copying works of art such as 
engravings require a certain understanding of art, which makes this 
activity different from copying for example a machine or a textile pat­
tern design.37 Here, Linguet described an aspect of creativity that 
would later become the prerequisite of originality in copyright. A legal 
breakthrough was the French revolutionary law of 1793, which on the 
one hand reiterated the prevailing ideas of more progressive circles, 
while on the other hand describing works of art as the product of 
spirit or genius, thus emphasising the requirement of originality.38
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Challenging copyright: reproduction technology in the 
19th century
Copyright history of the 19th century is a complex subject, and 
it is impossible to outline its many branches in this brief article; 
only a few aspects cdn be pointed out here. One is the internati­
onalisation of the art market, as reflected in exhibitions and coll­
ecting patterns, which in turn led artists to demand international 
copyright protection. Many international conferences made pleas 
for a harmonisation of copyright regulations, such as the Congres 
de la propriety litteraire et artistique, which was held in Brussels 
in 1858. There were many more similar events and petitions. The 
convention of Berne, agreed in 1886, was a major success of these 
efforts.39 Copyright laws were consolidated throughout the 19th cen­
tury, and the generation of copyright laws from about 1900 show a 
solid degree of maturity and complexity, incorporating laws formerly 
regulating different media into one statute. Another aspect is the 
artists’ own concern for copyright issues. Just one example is the 
pamphlet by Horace Vernet dating from 1841, in which he argued 
against a planned legal provision giving the copyright of a work of 
art to its buyer, where it should rest with the artist (as it indeed does 
today).40 Many artists were capitalising on reproductive engravings 
from their paintings.41 For example, many of Edwin Landseer’s paint­
ings were made with the engraving in mind.42 Other stars of repro­
ductive engraving, to mention but two, were Delaroche and Gerome 
in France. Both partnered with the influential print publisher, Goupil 
& Co.43 The list could be continued. It was important to define the 
mutual rights and obligations of the artist and the engraver. Deri­
vative works such as engravings may involve creative decisions; as 
a consequence, they become originals in the sense of copyright, 
without diminishing the copyright of the original author: the repro­
ductions are legal provided they are authorised by the author of the 
original (as in itmodel of the reproduction#).44
The third important aspect of nineteenth-century developments 
is the challenge of photography. At the time of its invention in 
the middle of the century, photography was seen as a non-creative 
and non-original, purely chemical and mechanical process used to 
copy nature and images.45 Only in the course of the following de­
cades did it come to be seen as a creative process, and photog­
raphs, thus, potentially original works of art. Different legal systems 
granted photography copyright protection at different times, and 
to various degrees.46 One of the earliest examples is the U.S. 
Copyright office, which in 1865 added photographs and photog­
raphic negatives to the list of protected works. The subsequent 
Copyright Act of 1870 also mentioned photographs, but the contro­
versy remained as to whether or not this act was constitutional. The 
Supreme Court settled the issue in 1884, when photographer Napo­
leon Sarony filed a copyright infringement suit against the Burrow-
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